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WHO JOINS TRADE UNIONS?: TESTING NEW SOCIOLOGICAL EXPLANATIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
 The existence of trade unions, and their ability to improve the lives of 
workers, ultimately hinges on their capacity to attract and maintain members.  
Consequently, many scholars interested in labour market issues have sought to 
understand why some workers join trade unions and others do not.  In exploring 
this issue, the social science literature takes different approaches.  The most general 
approach starts from the premise that, for various reasons, different types of 
workers have different propensities to join trade unions.  Here studies proceed by 
comparing the characteristics of members and non-members, with the aim of 
identifying prominent determinants of trade union participation.  Several important 
findings emerge from these types of studies.  First, it appears that younger workers 
are considerably less likely to join trade unions than their older counterparts 
(Brady 2007; Bryson and Gomez 2005; Haynes et al 2005; Machin 2004; Schnabel 
and Wagner 2005; Western 1994; Windolf and Haas 1989).  Second, workers with 
left-leaning political views are more likely to be trade union members than workers 
with centre or right-leaning political views (Bryson and Gomez 2005; Schnabel and 
Wagner 2005, 2007; Windolf and Haas 1989).  Finally, female workers are less 
likely to be unionized than their male counterparts (Brady 2007; Bryson and Gomez 
2005, Machin 2004; Schnabel and Wagner 2005; Visser 2002; Western 1994; 
Windolf and Haas 1989).  Overall, an important implication of these findings is that 
trade unions will likely struggle to sustain the size of their membership roles, 
because workers who are less inclined to join trade unions are becoming more 
prevalent in the workforce. 
 Since unionization rates vary significantly across affluent democracies, 
another prominent approach emphasizes the institutional context in which trade 
unions operate.  Broadly speaking, this perspective considers the possibility that 
different types of labour-market institutions generate different levels of support for 
labour organizing.   Studies based on survey data find that workers are more apt to 
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be unionized when trade unions operate in labour markets underpinned by 
centralized wage-bargaining, corporatist policymaking procedures, workplace 
access for union organizers, and union-controlled unemployment insurance 
schemes (Brady 2007; Western 1994).  It is thought that these  institutional 
arrangements help to facilitate class solidarity, thereby making it easier for trade 
unions to attract and maintain members.     
 Being interested in developing a better understanding of why some workers 
join trade unions and others do not, the present study seeks to move the 
abovementioned literature in a new direction.  While the demographic and 
institutional factors discussed above clearly account for much of the observed 
variation in trade union participation, it also seems possible that certain 
behavioural and attitudinal differences among workers may account for some of 
this variation as well.  Evidence from two prominent sociological literatures 
supports this premise. The first literature focuses on social capital and civil society 
(Hall 1999; Li et al 2003; Putnam 1995, 2000).  Here the key insight is that norms 
underpinning participation in voluntary organizations, such as trade unions, are not 
immutable but rather vary across time and segments of society.  In the context of 
the present study, this argument suggests that individuals who regularly participate 
in civil society may be more inclined to join trade unions than their less civically 
active counterparts.  The second literature focuses on attitudinal changes brought 
about by rising affluence and social stability, which supposedly lead younger 
generations to view socio-cultural and environmental concerns, rather than 
economic issues, as society’s most pressing concerns (Inglehart 1971, 1990, 1997).  
For the present study, this perspective suggests that people with ‘post-materialist’ 
values may be disinclined to join trade unions, because trade unions deal with basic 
economic issues, such as wages and working conditions.  
This study seeks to articulate and test these two hypotheses.  It begins by 
elaborating the theoretical rationale for why the decision to join a trade union is 
likely affected by one’s propensity to participate in civic and political affairs, and by 
one’s cultural and political values.  Then, based on data from the fifth wave of the 
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World Value Survey (WVS)—covering more than 7,000 workers across 12 affluent 
democracies—these hypotheses are tested with binary logistic regression models.  
To anticipate my main findings, the results show that individual-level variation in 
trade union membership is positively correlated with civic and political 
engagement, with left-of-centre political views, but not with post-materialist values.  
Unfortunately, difficulties in constructing time-series data prevent more 
comprehensive tests of these relationship, especially ones that could assess 
whether these factors are responsible for changes levels of trade union 
participation over time.  Similarly, difficulty in finding suitable instrument variables 
within the WVS prevents the use of statistical controls for possible circular patterns 
of causation—for example, the possibility that trade union membership affects 
political participation as well as the other way around.  These limitations and their 
possible ramifications are discussed in the method’s section and in the conclusion.  
Despite these limitations, this study represents an interesting starting point for 
assessing the determinants of trade union participation in a new light.  
 
NEW EXPLANATIONS FOR TRADE UNION PARTICIPATION 
Civic and Political Engagement 
 It is well-established within sociology that individuals can enhance their 
capacities to achieve desired ends by collaborating with people who share similar 
goals (Tocqueville [1840]/2000; Bourdieu 1986; Coleman 1988; Putnam 1993).  
The key contention is that isolated individuals typically have little power, but when 
such individuals band together, they can achieve ends that were impossible through 
the actions of lone individuals.  Consequently, collective action is an important 
means by which less powerful people can solve common problems and mould 
society in their interests.  In the early 19th century, Tocqueville made such an 
observation about ordinary Americans, noting that the propensity to join voluntary 
associations made the United States more egalitarian than comparable European 
societies at that time.  He wrote that,   
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in democratic peoples, all citizens are independent and weak; 
they can do almost nothing by themselves, and none of them can 
oblige those like them to cooperate.  They therefore fall into 
impotence if they do not learn to aid each other freely..... [Thus, 
when ordinary people want to accomplish something,] they seek 
each other out; and when they have found each other, they 
unite.  From then on, they are no longer isolated men, but a 
power one sees from afar, whose actions serve as an example; a 
power that speaks, and to which one listens. (Tocqueville 
[1840]/2000: 490-2) 
Modern social science generally corroborates this view—finding, for instance, that 
civically engaged citizens are important determinants of stable and democratic 
political systems (Almond and Verba 1963; Putnam 1993).  
More recent research, however, finds that civic participation is waning 
across broad swaths of society in the United States (Putnam 1995, 2000; Andersen, 
Curtis, and Grabb 2006; c.f. Paxton 1999), and among the working class in Britain in 
particular (Hall 1999; Li et al 2003).  Evidently, increasing numbers of people in 
these two countries are prioritizing individual pursuits over communal activities.  
This trend not only focuses social life more tightly around the private sphere of 
family and close friends, but it also magnifies the Anglo-American tradition of 
privileging the individual over society, with one consequence being that ordinary 
people are becoming less inclined to use collective action to achieve common goals 
(Baumam 2009; Luke 2006).   
 Importantly, for the topic at hand, this body of scholarship hints at the 
possibility that the cultural practices and traditions surrounding civic participation 
may account for some of the observed variation in trade union participation among 
workers.  While this question has not been systematically addressed until now, 
prior studies provide some insights into this possibility.  For instance, studies based 
on survey data consistently find that young workers are considerably less likely to 
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be trade union members than their older counterparts (Bryson and Gomez 2005; 
Haynes et al 2005; Machin 2004; Schnabel and Wagner 2005; Western 1994; 
Windolf and Haas 1989).  In the context of the Dutch labour market, Visser (2002) 
uses the ‘social customs’ theory to explain declining participation in trade unions.  
In particular, he contends that the decision to join (or not join) a trade union is  
influenced by prevailing social norms, which are established and re-established by 
the ongoing actions of co-workers, family, and friends (see also Goerke and 
Pannenberg 2004).  Where joining a trade union was once the social norm in the 
Netherlands, Visser believes this is no longer the case, especially for younger 
workers.  The erosion of this social custom, he argues, is contributing to the 
dwindling ranks of organized labour in the Netherlands.  Likewise, a similarly study 
finds that more and more British workers have never been trade union members, 
with the greatest portion being young workers (Bryon and Gomez 2005).  This 
finding holds even after accounting for the reduced opportunities to join trade 
unions, brought about by the declining number of unionized workplaces in Britain.  
In sum, the studies mentioned above implicate changing norms of participation with 
declining trade unionism.       
 
Cultural and Political Values 
 For most of the modern era, politics in democratic countries centred on 
class-based issues (Lipset 1960; Mann 1993).  This occurred in large part because 
industrial capitalism created unprecedented amounts of wealth but distributed this 
wealth in highly uneven ways.  Consequently, society and politics split along class 
lines, with the numerically small but institutionally powerful industrialists seeking 
to protect their privileges and the numerically large but institutionally weak 
working classes seeking to redistribute income and broaden social rights.  This 
enduring political dynamic resulted in what Lipset (1960) called the ‘democratic 
class struggle’.  
 Trade unions, of course, played a significant role in these political struggles 
(Lipset 1960).  Foremost, trade unions provide the institutional means by which 
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workers can ban together in voluntary associations and develop strong links with 
left-labour political parties.  This places trade unions at the heart of struggles over 
the direction of economic and social-welfare policy.  Given this overt political role, it 
is not surprising that workers with left-leaning political views would are thought to 
be more likely to join trade unions than workers with centre or right-leaning 
political views (Bryson and Gomez 2005; Schnabel and Wagner 2005, 2007; 
Windolf and Haas 1989).   
 The centrality of class-based politics, however, has not lasted to the present 
day.  Over the last few decades, the ‘democratic class struggle’ has been partially 
eclipsed by other forms of political contestation (Clark and Lipset 1991; Hechter 
2004; Inglehart 1971; Inglehart and Rabier 1986).  In recent decades, much of the 
pressure for social change has come not from poorly paid workers seeking 
egalitarian economic and social policies, but from a range of social actors seeking 
greater environmental protections and the dismantlement of traditional gender, 
racial, and sexual hierarchies.  This is not to say that traditional left-right class 
politics has been supplanted by ‘new politics’—for example, class voting is still 
strong in many affluent countries (Achterberg 2006; van der Waal et al 2007).  
Rather, it means that left-right class politics now shares the political arena with 
other political concerns.  
Perhaps more than any other scholar, Inglehart has put forward the most 
convincing and systematically articulated explanation for these political changes 
(Inglehart 1971, 1990, 1997; Inglehart and Abramson 1994; Inglehart and Rabier 
1986).  Drawing on the European Values Survey and the World Values Survey, his 
considerable body of work shows that a broad array of affluent countries is 
experiencing widespread attitudinal change, in which successive generations 
become more likely to view socio-cultural and environmental concerns, rather than 
economic issues, as society’s most pressing problems.  This new value orientation, 
which he labels ‘post-materialism’, is supposedly brought about by rising economic 
prosperity, which in the West has eradicated scarcity for most people, including 
most people in the working class.  Inglehart contends that, with decent living 
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standards being largely assured for most people, younger generations increasingly 
turn their attention to quality of life issues, such as the desire for greater freedom of 
self-expression, more opportunities for democratic decision-making, and better 
preservation of the natural environment.  This is not the case, however, for older 
generations who were socialized during times of economic scarcity and social 
instability (i.e. during the Great Depression or World War Two). 
The rise of post-materialist values should have implication for trade unions. 
Given that trade unions deal with basic economic issues, such as wages and fringe 
benefits, and given that trade unions are bureaucratic organizations run by 
professional managers, it seems likely that the spread of post-materialism would 
hinder their ability to recruit new members.  Inglehart makes this claim directly, 
stating that post-materialism will cause ‘elite-directed hierarchical organizations, 
such labor unions, to lose members’ (Inglehart and Catterberg 2002: 302).  Here his 
contention is not that post-materialism engenders civic and political apathy, but 
rather that it inspires new forms of participation, ones that eschew involvement in 
formal organizations run by elites in favour of participation in informal groups 
whose goals are determined by ordinary members.  As Inglehart writes, post-
materialism leads people to ‘engage in types of political action that do not leave 
written membership lists, because they are elite-challenging activities that are 
loosely coordinated by ad hoc groups that come into existence suddenly and 
disappear just as suddenly’ (p. 302).  For Inglehart, it is clear that people with post-
materialist values will have little interest in trade unions.  
However, in contrast to Inglehart’s view, there is another plausible 
interpretation of the relationship between post-materialism and trade unions.  In a 
highly influential work, Freeman and Medoff (1984) depicted trade unions as 
having ‘two faces’, with each face pursuing different types of goals.  The ‘monopoly 
face’ of trade unions aims to increase the wages and fringe benefits of its members, 
a goal that is consistent with Inglehart’s concept of materialist values.  Conversely, 
the ‘collective voice face’ of trade unions aims to develop the means by which 
workers can identify and redress problems in the workplace and in the national 
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economy.  Under this guise, trade unions are not addressing economic issues in the 
narrow sense of monetary well-being, but rather a whole range of work-related 
issues.   Similar ideas about the non-materialist aspects of trade unions have been 
expressed by other labour scholars (i.e. Fantasia 1988).  Importantly, since the 
desire to participate in decision-making processes is an essential post-materialist 
value, this aspect of trade unionism should appeal to workers with post-materialist 
values.  Hence, it could be that the different faces of trade unions appeal to different 
value orientations, with materialists favouring the monopoly face and post-
materialists favouring the collective voice face.   
 
DATA AND RESEARCH STRATEGY 
Data  
To empirically test the theoretical propositions developed above, I assemble 
data from the fifth wave of the World Value Survey (WVS), a freely available source 
of high-quality, cross-national survey data.  Conducted in 2005 and 2006, the fifth 
wave of the WVS comprises nationally representative surveys from countries 
around the world.   In each country, the survey was administered face-to-face with 
anywhere from 1,000 to 3,500 randomly selected adults.  The primary aim of the 
WVS is to provide the social science community with comparable, cross-national 
data on people’s values, beliefs, and norms.  Fortunately, it also gathers basic 
demographic, occupational, and associational information, including one question 
about trade unions membership.  This question constitutes the dependent variable 
of this study. 
For two reasons, the study uses only a portion of the data available from the 
WVS.   First, authoritarian and quasi-democratic countries were eliminated from the 
sample.  This was done to focus the analysis on those countries in which trade 
unions play comparable roles in politics, civil society and the economy.  Without 
this step, comparisons across dissimilar countries would be difficult.  For instance, 
involvement with trade unions in China (with its government-controlled unions) or 
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in Mexico (with its use of company unions) is not the same phenomenon as 
involvement with trade unions in the democratic West, where trade unions have 
traditionally been independent members of civil society rather than appendages of 
state or corporate power.  To avoid these complications, the sample is limited to 
respondents living in affluent countries where trade unions operate within 
democratic political systems and open civil societies.  Second, following other 
scholars using similar data (Western 1994; Brady 2007), respondents outside of the 
formal workforce are not used in the study.   This is accomplished by discarding 
pensioners, homemakers, students, and the unemployed from the sample.   
Combined, these two steps yield a data set comprising 7,238 full- or part-time 
workers living in one of 12 affluent democracies: Australia, Britain, Canada, Finland, 
France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and USA.  
(Missing data precluded Italy and New Zealand from being in the sample.)  Finally, 
due to changes in questions across waves of the WVS, attempts to create a time-
series dimension for this cross-section of countries were unsuccessful.  The 
implications of this issue are discussed in the conclusion.   
Measures 
Dependent variable. The dependent variable is a binary measure of trade 
union participation.  It is derived from a question asking respondents whether they 
are trade union members, and if so, whether they are active or inactive participants.  
Since the active-inactive distinction is not germane to this study, all active and 
inactive members are coded as ‘1’ and non-members as ‘0’.   
Key explanatory variables. The study has four key explanatory variables.  
The first one, civic participation, measures a respondent’s involvement with 
voluntary organizations.  It is constructed from a battery of questions asking 
respondents whether they are active or inactive members of eight different types of 
voluntary organizations: church or religious organizations; sport or recreational 
organizations; art, music or educational organizations; environmental 
organizations; professional associations; humanitarian or charitable organizations; 
consumer organizations; or any other voluntary organizations.   For each type of 
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voluntary organizations, active or inactive members are coded as ‘1’ and non-
members are coded as ‘0’.  Next, the number of memberships in different types of 
voluntary organizations are tallied,  yielding a continuous variable ranging from 
zero (involvement with no voluntary organizations) to eight (involvement with 
eight different types of voluntary organizations).   Note that this measure 
undercounts participation when respondents belong to two or more voluntary 
organizations from a single category.  Due to the wording of the survey, such 
situations will still be coded as ‘1’.   
The second key explanatory variable measures political participation.  This 
variable is constructed from a battery of questions asking respondents whether 
they have engaged in any of the following political activities over the last five years:  
signed a petition, joined a boycott, attended a peaceful demonstration, or any other 
political activity.  Additionally, two other questions ask whether respondents voted 
in the last national election and whether they belong to a political party.   This 
creates six possible types of political activities.  For each activity, respondents are 
coded as ‘1’ if they have recently engaged in that activity and ‘0’ if they have not.   
The different types of political activities are tallied, yielding a continuous variable 
ranging from zero (no recent political involvement) to six (recent involvement in six 
different types of political activities.)   Like the measurement above, this one also 
undercounts participation when respondents are involved in multiple activities 
within one category.    
The other two key explanatory variables measure political and cultural 
values.  The variable right political values assesses left-right political orientation.  It 
is based on a question asking respondents to place their political views on a 10-
point continuum, in which ‘1’ equals ‘the left’ and ‘10’ equals ‘the right’.  This yields 
a continuous variable ranging from 1 (the left) to 10 (the right).  The final key 
explanatory variable measures cultural values using Inglehart’s 12-item post-
materialist index.  This index is based on 12 questions, each tapping one of two 
value orientations.  Based on the answers to these questions, ‘materialists’ are 
people placing high priority on fighting inflation, promoting economic growth, 
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maintaining economic stability, maintaining social order, combating crime, and 
maintaining national security.  Conversely, ‘post-materialists’ are people placing 
high priority on protecting free speech, enhancing democratic decision-making, 
having a voice in workplace affairs, enhancing the aesthetic qualities of their 
communities, making society more humane, and reducing the importance of money 
in society.  The resulting variable ranges from 1 (materialist) to 6 (post-materialist).   
Demographic variables.  The model accounts for several demographic factors 
thought to affect trade union participation.  Educational attainment is measured as 
one of four categories: completed university or higher, some university, completed 
secondary school, and failed to complete secondary school.  Occupation is measured 
as one of six categories: executive management, professional, routine white-collar, 
skilled trade, unskilled labour, and other.  Sector of employment is identified as 
either the private, public, or non-profit sector.   Other control variables account for 
gender (1= male and 0 = female) and age (1= young [18-29], 2 = middle-aged [30-
49], and 3 = older [50 and above]).   Finally, for the four English-speaking countries 
in the sample, it was possible to develop control variables for race (1 = white and 0 
= non-white) and for ethnicity ( 1 = English speaker and 0 = any other language).  
However, due to country-by-country differences in how minority-majority relations 
manifest and are coded in the WVS, it was not possible to construct these two 
variables for the other countries in the sample.   
[Insert table 1 about here.] 
 
Statistical Estimation 
To empirically assess whether individual-level variation in trade union 
participation is affected by the aforementioned variables, I use binary logistic 
regression (BLR) analysis.  Like ordinary least squares (OLS)regression, BLR is a 
basic statistical technique used to model variation within a dependent variable 
based on variation within one or more explanatory variables.  Under both 
techniques, the explanatory variables can be of any kind—for example, interval-
scale, ordinal in dummy-variable format, nominal in dichotomies, etc.  But unlike 
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OLS, BLR is used when the dependent variable is dichotomous.  In the present 
study, this technique is used to understand how the likelihood of being a trade 
union member, a binary outcome, relates to one’s involvement in civic and political 
affairs, one’s cultural and political values, and one’s demographic background.  
Following conventions for BLR, the parameter estimates are expressed as odds 
ratios, which can be interpreted as the odds persons differing by one unit along the 
explanatory variable will differ in respect to the dependent variable, holding the 
other variables in the model constant.  In particular, odds ratios greater than ‘1’ 
indicate an increased likelihood of being a trade union member, whereas odds 
ratios less than ‘1’ indicate a decreased likelihood of being a trade union member.  
For ordinal variables in dummy-variable format, the odds ratio for the reference 
category is ‘1’, albeit this number is not reported.   
Before the models can be estimated, two methodical complications should be 
addressed.  First, it is well known that pooling cross-national data into a single data 
set can introduces confounding factors related to unmeasured, country-specific 
effects.  For example, it is likely that institutional differences among countries affect 
the propensity of workers in my sample to be unionized, yet these institutional 
difference have not been incorporated into the model—i.e. corporatist bargaining 
systems or union-controlled unemployment insurance schemes (see Brady 2007).  
Even if all such institutional factors are included in the model, it is still likely that 
country-specific factors remain unaddressed.  Hence, to control for these 
unmeasured ‘fixed effects’, I use a dummy variable to indentify each respondent’s 
country of residence. .  This step has been taken by other scholars seeking to control 
for fixed effects in BLR models of unionization (i.e. Rosenfeld and Kleykamp 2009). 
Another complication arises from the possibility that casual relationships 
between the some of the independent variables and the dependent variable are 
circular rather an unidirectional.  It could be, for instance, that one’s propensity to 
engage in political activities not only affects one’s propensity to join a trade union, 
but that the reverse is also true—namely that being a trade union member 
heightens one’s likelihood of being involved in politics.  Such feedback loops are 
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common in many social and economic processes.  Yet, if left unaddressed by the 
statistical model, they can result in suboptimal parameter estimates.  For this 
reason, regression techniques have been developed to overcome this complication, 
but they require that researcher finds suitable instrument variables, which by 
definition must be correlated with the independent variable embedded in the 
feedback loop, but not with the dependent variable.  Once identified, the instrument 
variables are used to derive a replacement for the independent variable embedded 
in the feedback loop.  Unfortunately, finding suitable instrument variables within 
the WVS proved to be unworkable, largely because the WVS was not designed to 
address the questions being examined in this study (and hence related variables 
could not be found within the survey).  Nonetheless, given the robustness of the 
findings presented below, it is unlikely that controls for simultaneity would alter 
the substantive conclusions drawn in this study, although they may reduce the size 
of some of the parameter estimates.           
 
FINDINGS 
Table 2 shows results from 13 BLR models of the individual-level 
determinants of trade union membership.  The parameter estimates are reported as 
odds ratios, with the corresponding p-values indicated by asterisks.  As customary 
when reporting odds ratios,  standard errors are not calculated.  Each model is 
based on the same set of variables, but uses data from different countries.  
Specifically, model 1 is based on pooled data from all 12 countries in the sample and 
the remaining models are based on data from one of the individual countries.  To 
focus the analysis on the research hypotheses, the variables of principal theoretical 
interest are discussed first and the control variables afterward.   
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Norms of Participation 
The analysis begins by examining the relationship between civic 
participation and the likelihood of being a trade union member.  Based on the 
theoretical logic outlined above, one would expect that people’s norms and habits 
regarding civic engagement would affect their likelihood of being unionized, with 
those being heavily involved in civil society showing the highest probability of being 
trade union members.  Consistent with this expectation, the regression results 
shown in table 2 indicate that involvement with civic organizations increases a 
worker’s likelihood of being unionized.  This is evidenced by the estimated odds 
ratios for the variable civic participation, which across all 13 models is statistically 
significant and considerably larger than ‘1’—outcomes that consistently indicate a 
positive relationship between civic and trade union membership.   Substantively, 
the results means that for each additional membership held in a different type of 
voluntary association a worker increases his or her likelihood of being a trade union 
member by as much as 80% in the Netherlands and by as little as 16% in Sweden.  
For the combined model (model 1), the likelihood of being a trade union member 
goes up by 35% for each membership in a different type of civic association.  
Importantly, these findings are consistent with my contention that trade union 
membership is influenced by larger norms and practices surrounding participation 
in civil society.   
Next, the analysis examines possible links between political participation 
and trade union membership.  Recall that, according to the theoretical logic outlined 
above, people who regularly participate in political activities are more likely to be 
trade union members than those who are politically inactive.  The results provide 
some support for this expectation.  This is evidenced by the estimated odds ratios 
for the variable political participation, which are larger than ‘1’ for all 12 countries, 
but statistically significant at the p>.10 level for only half of them.  For the sample as 
a whole, the odds ratio is 1.263 and statistically significant.  Overall, these results 
provide qualified support for the idea that regular participation in political affairs 
predisposes workers to be trade union members.    
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[Insert Table 2 about here.] 
 
Values Orientations   
Next, the analysis considers whether the political values of workers affect 
their likelihood of being trade union members.  Here the basic assumption is that—
since trade unions seek economic redistribution, and since economic redistribution 
is the domain of left politics—people with left-leaning political views will be more 
inclined to join trade unions than people with centrist or right-leaning political 
views.  The regression results provide reasonable support for this expectation.  As 
predicted, the estimated odds ratios for the variable right political values are less 
than ‘1’ for all 13 models, suggesting that workers’ with right political values are 
less likely to join trade unions across all the countries in my sample.  However, the 
estimated odds ratios are not statistically significant in four out of 12 countries.  
Hence, the  substantive interpretation of these results is that—for each incremental, 
rightward movement along the 10-point, left-right scale—workers decrease their 
chances of being unionized by as much as 28% in the Netherlands but by 0% in 
Canada, France, Japan, and the United States.  For the sample as a whole, a one-point 
rightward movement along the left-right scale is associated with a 15% reduction in 
the odds of being unionized.  Again, these results generally support the idea that the 
political values of workers influence their likelihood of joining trade unions, but 
they also highlight significant cross-national differences in this regard.    
Finally, the analysis assesses the relationship between post-materialist 
values and the odds of being unionized.  Given that trade unions focus on basic 
economic issues, such wages and fringe benefits, it seems possible that trade unions 
would have limited appeal for workers whose personal values orient them towards 
non-economic issues, such as environmental protection, gender equality, and 
freedom of self-expression.  However, as Freeman and Medoff (1984) note, trade 
unions also give workers a collective voice over important issues affecting their 
working lives, a goal that is consistent with post-materialist values.  The regression 
results are generally indicative of no systematic relationship between post-
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materialist values and trade union participation.  For nearly all of the models, the 
estimated odds ratios for the variable post-materialist values are close to ‘1’ and 
statistically insignificant, suggesting that post-materialist values having little 
bearing on trade union participation.  For Great Britain, the estimated odds ratio is 
0.83 and statistically significant at the p>.10 level, a finding that lends some support 
to Inglehart’s argument about post-materialism and trade union participation.  
However, given the heightened probability of a type 1 error under multiple 
comparisons, caution should be exercised when interpreting Britain as an anomaly 
in this regard.  
Demographic Control Variables  
The demographic control variables yield few surprises.  Net of the effects arising 
from the key explanatory variables, educational and racial differences among 
workers are found to have little influence over the odds of being unionized, but 
difference across gender, age, occupation, and sector of employment are found to 
influence trade union participation.  More specifically, looking at the pooled model, 
the results indicate that being male, middle-aged or older, and a public sector 
worker increase one’s odds of being unionized.  Here the most notable finding is 
that younger workers are less likely to be unionized than their middle-aged and 
older counterparts—a finding that is consistent with several other studies (e.g. 
Bryson and Gomez 2005; Goerke and Pannenberg 2004; Visser 2002; Windolf and 
Haas 1989). 
[Insert table 3 about here.] 
Recoded Variables 
To examine the subject in a slightly different light, the main variables are 
recoded, changing them from interval-scale variables to ordinal variables in 
dummy-variable format (see table 3). To make the analysis more succinct, this 
additional step is undertaken only for the English-speaking countries and for the 
dataset as a whole.  Changing the level of measurement in this way allows for the 
[18] 
 
possibility that the estimated effects differ at various points along the independent 
variables’ distributions.  Indeed, judging from the results of the re-estimated odds 
ratios, this appears to be the case.  
The re-estimated results provide evidence of a positive but non-linear effect 
between civic and political participation and the odds of being unionized.  Looking 
at the combined model, the re-estimated regression results show that workers 
involved with one type of civic association have basically the same odds of being 
unionized as workers avoiding civic participation altogether.  This contrasts 
significantly with workers belonging to four or more types of civic associations.  
Here the results show that these workers are more than three times more likely to 
be unionized than their civically inactive counterparts, and about two times more 
likely to be unionized than workers involved with three types of civic associations.  
This suggests a non-linear relationship, since those workers with the highest levels 
of civic participation are far and away the most likely to be unionized.  The re-
estimated odds ratios for political participation exhibit similar patterns.  
The effects of left-right political values on trade union participation exhibit a 
similar, non-liner pattern.  Looking at the combined model, the re-estimated 
regression results shows that the odds of being unionized are not statistically 
different for workers with right and centre-right political values.  Yet, compared to 
workers with right political values, the odds of being unionized increases 
substantially for workers with centre, centre-left and left political values, with 
highest odds being associated with workers indentifying as having left political 
values.  Specifically, the re-estimated odds ratios indicate that, compared to workers 
with right political values, the likelihood of being unionized increases by 65% for 
workers with centrist political values, by 84% for workers with centre-left political 
values, and by 147% for workers with left political values.  Interestingly, these 
results show only small differences in trade union participation among workers 
with centre and centre-left political values, but substantial differences for workers 
with left political values.  Finally, consistent with the results shown in table 2, there 
is no statistically significant difference between workers with materialist, mixed, 
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and post-materialist values, except in Great Britain where there is some evidence 
suggesting that workers with materialist values are more likely to join trade unions.   
 
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
This study develops and tests new sociological explanations for why some 
workers join trade union and others do not.  Past research uses demographic and 
institutional accounts to explain why trade union participation varies among 
workers.  What has been under-developed in these accounts is an understanding of 
how the social practices and values of workers influence their decisions to join 
trade unions.  Despite recent attempts to move the literature in this direction—for 
example Brady’s (2007) emphasis on class solidarity and Visser’s (2002) and 
Goerke and Pannenberg’s (2004) emphasis on social customs—more scholarship 
from this perspective is needed.  Motivated to prod the literature further in this 
direction, the present study assesses the possibility that workers’ histories of civic 
and political engagement, as well as their political and cultural values, are important 
determinants of trade union participation.   This hypothesis was empirically tested 
with data from the fifth wave of the World Value Survey, encompassing over  7,000 
workers from 12 affluent democracies.  Controlling for a host of occupational, 
educational, and demographic factors linked  to unionization, the results indicate 
that individual-level variation in trade union membership is positively correlated 
with civic and political participation, with left-leaning political views, but not with 
the post-materialist values.  Remarkably, despite significant institutional differences 
among these countries, these results were generally consistent across the 12 
countries examined in this study.      
Despite the robustness and consistency of the statistical results across the 
12-country sample, the substantive findings should be interpreted with some 
caution.  As discussed above, the statistical models do not account for the possibility 
of circular patterns causation between some of the explanatory variables and trade 
union membership.  For example, it could be that involvement with organized 
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labour increases one’s likelihood of being politically engaged, as well as the other 
way around.  After all, trade unions have compelling reasons to encourage their 
members to vote, to sign petitions, and to join political parties.  Circular causation 
could also occur between trade union participation and left-leaning political values, 
with the experience of being a trade union member generating greater appreciation 
of left politics in general.  This type of circular causation, of course, could not affect 
the demographic variables in the model.  For instance, the act of joining a trade 
union cannot change a person’s sex or age, nor is it likely to alter a person’s level of 
education or occupation.   
What about the relationship between trade union participation and civic 
participation? This study puts forward compelling theoretical and empirical 
evidence that workers’ general involvement in civic affairs affects their odds of 
being unionized.  But could the reverse also be true?  The likelihood of this seems 
small to me.  While trade unions have sound reasons to encourage political 
participation among their members—since such activities help them achieve their 
organizational aims—they have few reasons to encourage boarder civic 
participation among their members.  In fact, at least in the United States, evidence 
shows that trade unions are poorly linked to other voluntary organizations 
(Cornwall and Harrison 2004).   Nevertheless, there may be some indirect effects, 
such as when workers are encouraged to join other civic associations by fellow 
trade union members, or when workers develop greater appreciation for 
volunteerism in general due to their experiences with trade unions.      
My estimation is that some of these causal relationships are characterized by 
complex feedback loops, in which each variable influences the other.  As described 
above, this is likely the case for trade union participation and political participation 
and for trade union participation and left-right political values.  Such circular 
patterns of causation frequently occur in social and economic affairs, such as when 
a job’s status and pay mutually reinforce one another.  Social scientists have 
developed quantitative methods for untangling these complex effects, but they 
entail the identification of suitable instruments for the independent variables 
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embedded within the circular causation, something that could not be found among 
the WVS data.  For this reason, we should keep in mind that some of the parameter 
estimates generated in this study, but especially the one for the variable political 
participation, are probably larger than the actual population parameters they 
approximate. However, given the size and robustness of the results, it seems  
improbable that controls for circular causal would alter the study’s main 
substantive conclusions.     
 Additionally, it is worth noting that the study is limited by the lack of 
temporal data.  Ideally, researchers want to know why unionization rates have been 
diverging across affluent democracies—creating the present situation in which, for 
example, union densities in Nordic countries are almost three times higher than 
those in English-speaking countries.  To make such an assessment, researchers need 
data that not only span different countries, but also different decades.   With this 
type of data, researchers could estimate what portion of a country’s declining union 
density is attributable to changing norms and  practices supporting civic and 
political participation (if any), and what portion is attributable to other factors 
(such as deindustrialization, neoliberal public policy, global trade, etc).  
Unfortunately, the WVS is not a good source for this type of data, at least not for the 
variables used in this study.  It was my experience that the variables used in this 
study were often changed or dropped from one wave to another.  Perhaps better 
sources of cross-national, temporal data can be found for future research.  
Nonetheless, despite these limitations, the present study provides valuable 
theoretical and empirical insights to the possibility that the habits, practices, and 
values of workers shape their decisions to join trade unions.  While qualified for the 
reasons mentioned above, the empirical findings are sufficiently robust to provide 
cautious support for the arguments being put forth in this study.  Importantly, the 
study’s explanation for individual-level variation in trade union membership may 
prove useful for understanding cross-national and temporal variations in trade 
union density.  For example, at least in Britain, the decline of organized labour has 
coincided with the decline of civic participation among the working class (Hall 
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1999; Li et al 2003) and with the growing popularity of right-leaning political views 
among the population in general (Curtice 2010: Figure 2.2).  When examined 
through the perspectives developed in this study, these trends suggest that changes 
in the practices and values of workers have played an underappreciated role in the 
changing fortunes of organized labour.  This possibility should be assessed by future 
research as well. 
Finally, although most of the findings in this study are consistent with 
theoretical expectations, an important finding is not.  The regression results 
indicate that the distinction between material and post-material values has little 
bearing on the odds of being unionized.  This finding, however, conflicts with the 
argument put forward by Ingelhart, which predicts that workers with post-
materialist values are less likely to join trade unions than workers with materialist 
values.  How can this finding be explained?  It could be that Inglehart’s theory is 
correct, but that his post-materialism index lacks sufficient measurement validity, 
something that might cause statistical models to miss an otherwise robust 
association between materialism and unionization.  Indeed, some scholars have 
questioned the measurement validity of Inglehart’s index (Davis and Davenport 
1999; Moors and Vermunt 2007).   However, it seems more probable that the 
empirical findings are accurate. 
The more plausible explanation centres on Freeman and Medoff’s account of 
the ‘two faces’ of trade unions.  In short, they argue that trade unions not only help 
workers gain higher wages and better fringe benefits (something prized by 
materialists), but also help workers gain a ‘collective voice’ over important issues 
affecting their work lives (something prized by post-materialists).  Recall that the 
desire to participate in decision making processes—to have one’s voice heard—is a 
paradigmatic post-materialist value.  Given that trade unions help workers to 
influence policy choices affecting the workplace and the larger economy, it seems 
logical that trade unions would attract significant numbers of workers with post-
materialist values.  Hence, a reasonable conclusion is not that value orientations 
have no effect on trade union participation, but rather that different aspects of trade 
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unionism appeal to different value orientations, with materialists favouring the 
monetary benefits of participation and post-materialists favouring the collective 
voice benefits of participation.  This is an interesting question that deserves further 
scrutiny.   
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Table 1.   Description of Variables Used in Statistical Analysis 
Variable Description 
Trade Union 
Member 
Two category variable distinguishing between trade union members 
and non-members, with 1 = member and 0 = non-member.  
 
Civic 
Participation 
 
Continuous variable ranging from 0 (belongs to no civic organizations) 
to 8 (belongs to eight different types of civic organizations).  
 
Political 
Participation 
 
Continuous variable ranging from 0 (engaged in no political activities) 
to 6 (engaged in six different types of political activities).   
 
Right Political 
Values 
Continuous variable measuring political orientation, ranging from 1 
(“the left”) to 10 (“the right”).  
 
Post-materialist 
Values 
Continuous variable measuring post-materialist cultural values, 
ranging from 1 (materialist) to 6 (post-materialist). Based on 
Inglehart’s (1990:74-5) 12-item index. 
  
Education Four category variable distinguishing university education, some 
university education, secondary education, and incomplete secondary 
education. Dummy variable coding with incomplete secondary 
education as the reference category. 
 
Occupation A six category variable distinguishing executive managers, 
professionals, routine white-collar workers, skilled labour, unskilled 
labour, and others. Dummy variable coding with unskilled labour as 
the reference category. 
 
Sector of 
Employment 
A three category variable distinguishing private sector, public sector, 
and non-profit sector employment.  Dummy variable coding with 
private sector as the reference category. 
 
Gender Dummy variable coding with females as the reference category. 
  
Race Dummy variable coding with non-white as the reference category. 
 
Ethnicity Three category variable indicating English speaker, French speaker, 
and other-language speaker.  Dummy variable coding with other-
language speaker as the reference category. 
 
Note:  The last two variables pertain only to the English-speaking countries in the 
sample: Australia, Canada, Great Britain, and the United States.   
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Table 2.  Odds Ratios from Binary Logistic Regressions: The Individual-level 
Determinants of Labour Union Membership in 12 Affluent Countries, 2005 
 
Independent Variables 
All 12 
Countries 
Great 
Britain 
United 
States 
 
Australia 
 
Canada 
Norms of participation      
     Civic participation   1.348*** 1.248*** 1.283*** 1.313*** 1.435*** 
     Political participation  1.263*** 1.498*** 1.005 1.599*** 1.310*** 
 
Political and cultural values 
     
     Right political values   .855*** .834*** .943 .868** .940 
     Post-materialist values  .990 .832* .868 1.064 1.007 
 
Education 
     
     University degree .989 1.262 1.091 .796 1.165 
     Some university 1.059 .825 1.341 1.099 1.199 
     Completed secondary .837 1.202 1.437 .863 .956 
     Didn’t complete secondary (ref)      
 
Occupation 
     
     Executive management  .334*** .580 .121*** .295** .432* 
     Professional .628** .761 .218** .649 .790 
     Routine white-collar .814 .675 .148*** .824 .907 
     Skilled trade   1.124 1.126 .338* 1.623 1.834* 
     Other .540** .690 .191*** .459 .616 
     Unskilled labour (ref)      
 
Sector of Employment 
     
     Public 3.658*** 4.409** 2.957*** 3.283*** 7.971*** 
     Non-profit 1.487** 1.172 .525* .804 1.056 
     Private (ref)      
 
Age 
     
     Young (18-29) .757** .841 .520* .715 .846 
     Middle-aged (30-49) 1.094 .972 .767 .969 1.103 
     Older (50 or older) (ref)      
 
Sex 
     
    Male (vs. female) 1.272** 1.233 2.190*** 1.137 1.781*** 
 
Ethnicity 
     
     English speaker   .329** .606 1.246 1.954* 
     French speaker     2.661*** 
     Other language (ref)      
 
Race      
     
     White (vs. non-White)  1.743 .783 .634 .705 
 
Number of observations 
 
7,238 
 
556 
 
710 
 
862 
 
1,156 
Note: Parameter estimates reported as odds. * p<.10; ** p <.05; *** p < .01 
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Table 2 (continued).  Odds Ratios from Binary Logistic Regressions: 
Individual-level Determinants of Trade Union Membership, 2005 
 
Independent Variables 
 Finland 
( 6) 
 France 
( 7) 
Germany 
( 8) 
Japan 
 ( 9) 
Norms of participation     
     Civic participation   1.318*** 1.552*** 1.776*** 1.396*** 
     Political participation  1.366*** 1.505*** 1.109 1.313 
 
Political and cultural values 
    
     Right political values   .806*** .871 .892* .874 
     Post-materialist values  1.027 .975 1.130 1.028 
 
Education 
    
     University degree 2.484** 3.340** .493 1.435 
     Some university 1.900 2.184 .183 1.001 
     Completed secondary .924 1.585 .920 1.502 
     Didn’t complete secondary (ref)     
 
Occupation 
    
     Executive management  .428 .820 .082**** 1.668 
     Professional 1.086 1.091 .695 .969 
     Routine white-collar 1.062 1.355 .828 1.830 
     Skilled trade   1.711 2.438 1.427 2.698* 
     Other .811 4.898* .333* .185 
     Unskilled labour (ref)     
 
Sector of Employment 
    
     Public 1.700** 1.952* 2.029** 2.090** 
     Non-profit 1.718 3.981* 1.200 .000 
     Private (ref)     
 
Age 
    
     Young (18-29) .998 .462 .460* 2.157* 
     Middle-aged (30-49) 1.219 .828 .778 1.667 
     Older (50 or older) (ref)     
 
Sex 
    
    Male (vs. female) .733 1.088 1.497* 1.766* 
 
Number of observations 
 
449 
 
414 
 
624 
 
452 
Note: Parameter estimates reported as odds. * p<.10; ** p <.05; *** p < .01 
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Table 2 (continued).  Odds Ratios from Binary Logistic Regressions: 
Individual-level Determinants of Trade Union Membership, 2005 
Independent Variables Netherlands 
( 10) 
 Norway 
( 11) 
Sweden 
( 12) 
Switzerland 
 ( 13) 
Norms of participation     
     Civic participation   1.803*** 1.552*** 1.161* 1.542*** 
     Political participation  1.279 1.492*** 1.176 1.019 
 
Political and cultural values 
    
     Right political values   .724*** .889* .787*** .754*** 
     Post-materialist values  .915 1.004 1.076 .923 
 
Education 
    
     University degree .191** .960 1.248 .340* 
     Some university .492 .699 .764 1.001 
     Completed secondary .811 .941 1.071 .978 
     Didn’t complete secondary (ref)     
 
Occupation 
    
     Executive management  .554 .406** .196***  
     Professional .822 .811 .484  
     Routine white-collar .702 1.102 .875  
     Skilled trade   2.013 1.555 .766  
     Other .661 .539 .436  
     Unskilled labour (ref)     
 
Sector of Employment 
    
     Public 3.402*** 4.960*** 2.572*** 3.378*** 
     Non-profit 2.392 1.001 3.005 2.092 
     Private (ref)     
 
Age 
    
     Young (18-29) .872 .644 .620 .695 
     Middle-aged (30-49) 1.296 .834 1.327 1.745** 
     Older (50 or older) (ref)     
 
Sex 
    
    Male (vs. female) 1.587 1.454* .845 1.052 
 
Number of observations 
 
294 
 
633 
 
565 
 
523 
Note: Parameter estimates reported as odds. * p<.10; ** p <.05; *** p < .01 
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Table 3.  Odds Ratios from Binary Logistic Regressions for Recoded Variables:  
Individual-level Determinants of Trade Union Membership, 2005 
 
Independent Variables 
All 12 
Countries 
Great 
Britain 
United 
States 
 
Australia 
 
Canada 
Civic participation        
     4 or more organizations 3.281*** 2.470** 2.353** 3.991*** 4.604*** 
     3 organizations 1.560*** .766 1.802 2.224** 1.716** 
     2 organizations 1.329* 1.540 .973 1.293 1.794** 
     1 organization 1.259 .998 .971 1.955** 1.331 
     None (ref)      
 
Political participation 
     
     3 or more activities  3.183*** 6.427*** 1.298 11.721*** 2.558*** 
     2 activities 1.727*** 3.185*** .897 4.376* 1.495 
     1 activity 1.387* 2.373** 1.001 4.029* 1.070 
     None (ref)      
      
Political Values      
     Left (1-2) 2.466*** 3.655* 2.684* 3.931** 1.383 
     Centre-Left (3-4) 1.844** 5.419** 2.451* 1.163 1.299 
     Centre (5-6) 1.654** 2.204* 2.074** 1.413 1.252 
     Centre-Right (7-8) 1.180 1.863 2.016 .809 .979 
     Right (9-10) (ref)      
 
Cultural Values 
     
     Materialist (1-2) 1.098 2.291** 1.695 .682 .968 
     Mixed (3-4) .998 1.437 1.482 .690 1.046 
     Post-materialist (5-6)(ref)      
 
Controls for education, occupation, 
sector of employment, ethnicity, 
age, sex, and race? 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 
Number of observations 
 
7,238 
 
556 
 
710 
 
862 
 
1,156 
Note: Parameter estimates reported as odds. * p<.10; ** p <.05; *** p < .01 
 
 
